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TV EDWARDS SOLICITORS LLP

How our family solicitors can still help you

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Anest Mathias
Associate Solicitor

There is no doubt that the country is going through a great period of stress, uncertainty and confusion. We have heard from some clients that this is causing increases in family discord including the breakdown of long term relationships. We are also worried to see media reports about the potential for a rise in domestic abuse.

For some, the need for protection will be greater than ever. Others will simply want to understand their likely position upon divorce or separation and what will happen to any children that they have. Even if couples are already separated, there may be disagreements about arrangements for their children and confusion over the guidance that has been issued about this by various bodies over recent days. We recognise that uncertainty can add to anxiety and that obtaining prompt legal advice is reassuring. We also understand that now could be a period where people have more private time to obtain legal advice. 

If you are at imminent risk of harm, you should always contact the police. It may be appropriate to apply for a protective injunction, such as a non-molestation order or occupation order.   

A non-molestation order is an order that prevents a person from molesting another. Non–molestation orders can contain specific terms and will frequently prohibit a person from:

  1. Using or threatening any unlawful violence towards the applicant.
  2. Damaging, attempting to damage or threatening to damage any property belonging to the applicant.
  3. Communicating with the applicant via text message, letter, social media or any other means of communication.
  4. Intimidating, harassing or pestering the applicant and instructing any other person from doing any of the above.

An occupation order is an order which regulates the occupation of the home and may exclude a person from the home.  We are able to advise about the suitability of such an order as well as making an emergency application to the court should this be appropriate.

Family courts are still operating during this period, albeit on a reduced basis and with most hearings taking place with online video technology or by telephone. We are able to ensure that you are represented at any such hearings.

Our telephone and IT systems are set up so that solicitors are able to continue working throughout this period. We have long since operated a paperless office, enabling us to  have secure access to all case papers remotely. We are doing everything we can to offer a seamless and supportive service as we understand this is when many need it the most.

If you would like to speak to a solicitor about your family circumstances please telephone us on 020 3440 8000.

TV EDWARDS SOLICITORS LLP

The English Family Court and the abducted Dubai Princesses

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Why did a family law judge in London make findings about what happened to two princesses living in Dubai?

Her Royal Princess Haya bint Al Hussein (“the mother”) has two children, Jalila aged 12 years and Zayah aged 8 years.  She is the daughter of His Majesty the later King Hussein of Jordan and the half-sister of the present ruler of Jordan, King Abdullah II. The children’s father is His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (“the father”). He is the ruler of the Emirate of Dubai and is the Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The father has 25 children, these included events relating to two of his adult daughters. Princess Shamsa and Princess Latifa. 

On 15 April 2019 the mother came to the UK with the children. Shortly afterwards she made it clear that she did not intend to return them to Dubai. In May 2019 the father commenced proceedings in the High Court. He sought the return of the children to Dubai under the court’s intrinsic ability to make decisions about children who are in this country.  

In July 2019 the mother issued applications for the children to be made Wards of Court, for a forced marriage protection order with respect to Jalila, which is an order that uses prohibitions, restrictions or requirements to prevent someone from being threatened or coerced into getting married against their will. The mother also sought a non-molestation order for her own protection, which is a common protection order where domestic abuse has been present in a close relationship.

By 8 October 2019 the father no longer pursued his application for the children to be returned to Dubai. He agreed that the children would now continue to live with their mother and be based with her in England.  He sought to re-establish and progressively develop his relationship with the children through contact. 

The mother filed a schedule of allegations which she made against the father. The father responded to these and the court held a fact finding hearing to decide whether what the mother said had happened was true. It was necessary to do this because the father’s past behaviour in relation to his family is an indicator of his likely future behaviour and would help the judge decide what safeguards should be in place, if any. It was for this reason that an English judge came to be deciding whether alleged events took place all over the world including in relation to the adult children, who the case did not concern.

The findings the mother sought were many and included that the father had orchestrated the unlawful abduction of his adult daughter Princess Shamsa in August 2000 and the forcible return of Princess Latifa in June 2002 and February 2018, that he had deprived them both of their liberty , that the father had sought to make arrangements for his 12 year old daughter to marry the (adult) Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and that the father had mounted a sustained campaign against the mother since the beginning of 2019 designed to instil fear and to intimidate her. With all of these allegations it was alleged that the father had instructed other people to undertake these steps on his behalf. 

The father maintained a stance that he would not attend court as a witness.

After hearing evidence from the mother and witnesses on her behalf, and after reading witness statements from the father and from witnesses on his behalf, The judge found the allegations that the mother made were proven apart from the allegation in relation to the forced marriage of Jalia. 

The father has given assurances and a waiver in an attempt to reassure the mother and the court about his future conduct towards the children. The court considered these in a separate judgment and decided it was unable to place any weight upon them providing protection for the children from the risk of abduction within England and Wales. 

The President of the Family Division gave a third judgment determining that both previous judgments should be made public and that prohibitions on reporting the names, age and gender of the two children were lifted. He later determined that the publications judgment together with certain aspects of what happened in court could be published. The father appealed the decisions about publications. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeals meaning the decision is final and binding.  All four judgments can be found here:

The court will now need to undertake a welfare evaluation of the children’s needs. It will need to evaluate the impact of the decisions about what happened historically upon the two young children. The court will need to balance the advantages to the children of re-establishing and maintaining their relationship with their father against the risk of either or both of them being removed from their mother’s care and taken to Dubai against the mother’s will.

Anest Mathias is a senior solicitor in the Family department at TV Edwards. She has broad professional experience including in relation to the international children issues raised in this case. Contact Anest on anest.mathias@tvedwards.com  or 020 3440 8049 for advice on a related query.

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Child Abduction – How we can help you

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TV Edwards LLP are one of only a limited number of law firms in England and Wales who have the requisite expertise to conduct these cases as they are on a panel of solicitors accredited by the International Child Abduction and Contact Unit (ICACU) for meeting the necessary standards for this complex area of work.

We regularly act for parents who consider that their children have unlawfully been removed from their home country (without their permission or permission from the local court) or that their children have been kept in another country following a temporary stay. Conversely, we also represent parents who may find themselves accused of abducting their children.  It could be, for example, that the parent who removed the children felt that they were legally entitled to do so, or may have done so as they felt they were in an unsafe situation that they needed to leave. It is also very common for a removal to take place if a parent has been living abroad but considers that going forwards; they would like to return to their home country where they may have the benefit of support from family and friends. Whatever the situation, cases involving child abduction are often a shock and can be distressing for all of those involved, particularly the children.

There are a number of international treaties and laws that govern these situations. They provide a mechanism for applications to be made for the children’s return to the original country. Whether any of the international treaties and laws apply to your situation will depend on from which country the children have been brought to England and Wales and TV Edwards LLP can provide you with advice about this. The most commonly used international treaty by parents to recover their children in these situations is the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the child abduction Hague Convention”).

It is very important that you seek specialist legal advice at the earliest opportunity, as this is a complex and ever changing area of family law. These cases are fast paced and it is important to act quickly so that you are aware of all of the available options to you so that you can make an informed decision about your next steps.

Legal aid is available in child abduction cases subject to your financial circumstances and the facts of your case. TV Edwards LLP have a legal aid contract and if you wished to instruct us, we would be happy to explore with you whether you may qualify for legal aid. 

If you are involved in a child abduction or other international children law situation then please contact Forum Shah our Accredited Specialist on +44(0)203 440 8000 or email forum.shah@tvedwards.com  or A_FamilyReferrals@tvedwards.com 

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W (A Child) 2020 – Appeal of refusal for permission to oppose adoption order

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In the recent case of W (A Child) [2020] EWCA Civ 16the parents successfully appealed the court’s decision for refusal of permission to oppose the making of an adoption order.

A child (B) had been removed from his parents’ care in April 2017 when he was two days old. He was subsequently made subject of a placement order in March 2018 and placed with prospective adopters in November 2018. The prospective adopters made an application to adopt B in April 2019. The parents applied for permission to oppose the adopters’ application. This was refused and the Guardian appealed that decision, supported by the parents.

Under s.47 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, there are certain conditions that must be met before an adoption order can be made. The parent of a child who has been placed for adoption under a placement order can only oppose the making of an adoption order with permission from the court.

There is a two stage process when the court is considering an application for permission to oppose an adoption order. The court has to ask itself 1) whether there has been a change in circumstances, and if so 2) whether leave to oppose be should given. The court must have regard to the parent’s ultimate prospects of success in opposing the making of an adoption order and the impact on the child if leave is granted or refused, bearing in mind the child’s welfare throughout his life.

The Court of Appeal determined the decision of the judge in the lower court had been wrong and noted the following:

  • To rule out the possibility of a birth family placement for B even at this late stage was premature
  • Evidence about the emotional and psychological effect on B of a further move needed to be fully considered. 
  • By excluding the possibility of B being cared for by his parents the judge was prevented from weighing up all the matters likely to be relevant to his welfare throughout his life. 
  • The factors the judge found compelling could not be accurately evaluated on the available evidence. 
  • There was evidence of considerable change from the parents leading to the return of B’s siblings to the family home. 
  • The negative aspects of a contested adoption hearing must always be taken into account, but in the absence of specific disadvantages, they cannot be given much weight. 
  • A short delay would not be very influential when considered alongside the lifelong significance of adoption. 

The appeal was allowed and the court granted permission to the parents to oppose the making of an adoption order. This does not mean that the application for the adoption order will be unsuccessful, but that the parents will have an opportunity to put forward their case in the adoption proceedings as to why an adoption order should not be made.

The full judgment can be found here: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/16.html

Lindsay Blake

Our experienced and specialist team will be happy to help if you have a query about the involvement of children’s services with your family, please contact us on 0203 440 8000.

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Important Court of Appeal Guidance on notification of fathers and extended family in adoption proceedings

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The Court of Appeal handed down judgment on 29 January 2020 in the case A, B and C (Adoption: Notification of Fathers and Relatives) [2020] EWCA Civ 41. This judgement provided important clarification on the contentious issue of when fathers and extended family members should be notified by the local authority and the Court of the plans for a child in the face of opposition from the mother. The Court heard appeals in three cases where the mothers had concealed their pregnancy and did not wish for others to be informed of the baby’s existence or the court proceedings for various reasons. In all cases adoption was a potential option for the child and in two of the cases the mother agreed to the adoption of the child.

The case was heard by The President of the Family Division, Lord Justice Peter Jackson and Lady Justice Nicola Davies. The lead judgement was given by Lord Justice Peter Jackson who acknowledged that such decisions are extremely difficult and personal.

Respect is due to the position of any mother who goes through pregnancy without family support and then chooses to relinquish the child at birth in the belief that it is for the best. Respect is also due to the position of the unsuspecting relatives. Some may have been a fleeting presence in the mother’s life, but others may be more significant figures who have been kept in the dark and would be astonished to find that a baby (their child, sibling or grandchild) had been born and adopted without their knowledge, particularly if they were in a position to put themselves forward as carers. Most of all, the notification decision has life-changing implications for the baby. It may influence whether adoption happens at all and, even if it does, a sound adoption has its foundations in the integrity of the process by which it is achieved.

For social workers and courts these are not easy decisions. They have to be made without delay, on incomplete information, and in the knowledge of the profound consequences for everyone concerned. The law aims to distinguish those cases where a ‘fast-track’ adoption without notification of relatives is lawful from the majority of cases where the profound significance of the decision for the child demands that any realistic alternatives to adoption are given proper consideration. But in the end each case is unique and the outcome must depend on the facts.”

Jackson LJ determined that the “welfare of the child, though relevant, is not the paramount consideration when making a decision as to who should be notified of the proposal for the child to be adopted”. He considered that the decision was not one “relating to the upbringing of a child” (CA 1989) or “relating to the adoption of a child” (ACA 2002) but a decision about who should be consulted about such a decision. Thus, while child welfare, prompt decision-making and a comprehensive review of every relevant factor, including those mentioned in the checklists, are all central to the notification decision, the decision is not one that is formally governed by the provisions of s.1 of the CA 1989 or of the ACA 2002 and the welfare of the child is not the paramount consideration of the local authority and the court in this context”

Jackson LJ went on to provide a helpful and comprehensive guide as to the approach to be taken in such cases:

“1. The law allows for ‘fast-track’ adoption with the consent of all those with parental responsibility, so in some cases the mother alone. Where she opposes notification being given to the child’s father or relatives her right to respect for her private life is engaged and can only be infringed where it is necessary to do so to protect the interests of others.

2. The profound importance of the adoption decision for the child and potentially for other family members is clearly capable of supplying a justification for overriding the mother’s request. Whether it does so will depend upon the individual circumstances of the case.

3. The decision should be prioritised and the process characterised by urgency and thoroughness.

4. The decision-maker’s first task is to establish the facts as clearly as possible, mindful of the often limited and one-sided nature of the information available. The confidential relinquishment of a child for adoption is an unusual event and the reasons for it must be respectfully scrutinised so that the interests of others are protected. In fairness to those other individuals, the account that is given by the person seeking confidentiality cannot be taken at face value. All information that can be discovered without compromising confidentiality should therefore be gathered and a first-hand account from the person seeking confidentiality will normally be sought. The investigation should enable broad conclusions to be drawn about the relative weight to be given to the factors that must inform the decision.

5. Once the facts have been investigated the task is to strike a fair balance between the various interests involved. The welfare of the child is an important factor but it is not the paramount consideration.

6. There is no single test for distinguishing between cases in which notification should and should not be given but the case law shows that these factors will be relevant when reaching a decision:

(1) Parental responsibility. The fact that a father has parental responsibility by marriage or otherwise entitles him to give or withhold consent to adoption and gives him automatic party status in any proceedings that might lead to adoption. Compelling reasons are therefore required before the withholding of notification can be justified.

(2) Article 8 rights. Whether the father, married or unmarried, or the relative have an established or potential family life with the mother or the child, the right to a fair hearing is engaged and strong reasons are required before the withholding of notification can be justified.

(3) The substance of the relationships. Aside from the presence or absence of parental responsibility and of family life rights, an assessment must be made of the substance of the relationship between the parents, the circumstances of the conception, and the significance of relatives. The purpose is to ensure that those who are necessarily silent are given a notional voice so as to identify the possible strengths and weaknesses of any argument that they might make. Put another way, with what degree of objective justification might such a person complain if they later discovered they had been excluded from the decision? The answer will differ as between a father with whom the mother has had a fleeting encounter and one with whom she has had a substantial relationship, and as between members of the extended family who are close to the parents and those who are more distant.

(4) The likelihood of a family placement being a realistic alternative to adoption. This is of particular importance to the child’s lifelong welfare as it may determine whether or not adoption is necessary. An objective view, going beyond the say-so of the person seeking confidentiality, should be taken about whether a family member may or may not be a potential carer. Where a family placement is unlikely to be worth investigating or where notification may cause significant harm to those notified, this factor will speak in favour of maintaining confidentiality; anything less than that and it will point the other way.

(5) The physical, psychological or social impact on the mother or on others of notification being given. Where this would be severe, for example because of fear arising from rape or violence, or because of possible consequences such as ostracism or family breakdown, or because of significant mental health vulnerability, these must weigh heavily in the balancing exercise. On the other hand, excessive weight should not be given to short term difficulties and to less serious situations involving embarrassment or social unpleasantness, otherwise the mother’s wish would always prevail at the expense of other interests.

(6) Cultural and religious factors. The conception and concealed pregnancy may give rise to particular difficulties in some cultural and religious contexts. These may enhance the risks of notification, but they may also mean that the possibility of maintaining the birth tie through a family placement is of particular importance for the child.

(7) The availability and durability of the confidential information. Notification can only take place if there is someone to notify. In cases where a mother declines to identify a father she may face persuasion, if that is thought appropriate, but she cannot be coerced. In some cases the available information may mean that the father is identifiable, and maternal relatives may also be identifiable. The extent to which identifying information is pursued is a matter of judgement. Conversely, there will be cases where it is necessary to consider whether any confidentiality is likely to endure. In the modern world secrets are increasingly difficult to keep and the consequences, particularly for the child and any prospective adopters, of the child’s existence being concealed but becoming known to family members later on, sometimes as a result of disclosure by the person seeking confidentiality, should be borne in mind.

(8) The impact of delay. A decision to apply to court and thereafter any decision to notify will inevitably postpone to some extent the time when the child’s permanent placement can be confirmed. In most cases, the importance of the issues means that the delay cannot be a predominant factor. There may however be circumstances where delay would have particularly damaging consequences for the mother or for the child; for example, it would undoubtedly need to be taken into account if it would lead to the withdrawal of the child’s established carers or to the loss of an especially suitable adoptive placement.

(9) Any other relevant matters. The list of relevant factors is not closed. Mothers may have many reasons for wishing to maintain confidentiality and there may be a wide range of implications for the child, the father and for other relatives. All relevant matters must be considered.

7. It has rightly been said that the maintenance of confidentiality is exceptional, and highly exceptional where a father has parental responsibility or where there is family life under Article 8. However exceptionality is not in itself a test or a short cut; rather it is a reflection of the fact that the profound significance of adoption for the child and considerations of fairness to others means that the balance will often fall in favour of notification. But the decision on whether confidentiality should be maintained can only be made by striking a fair balance between the factors that are present in the individual case.”

This case provides a helpful reminder of the importance of addressing the issue of notification at an early stage and carefully considering the approach based on the specific facts of the case. It will be very unusual for a father not to be notified but in some circumstances it will be appropriate to maintain confidentiality based on the application of the above test.

The full Judgment can be found here: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/41.html

Claire Longland

Our experienced and specialist team will be happy to help if you have a query about  the involvement of children’s services with your family, please do not hesitate to contact our Family team on 020 3440 8020.

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An important new case on Secure Accommodation Orders

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The Court of Appeal recently gave a judgment in the matter of B (Secure Accommodation Order) [2019] EWCA Civ 2025 which has provided much needed clarification on the interpretation of the Section 25 criteria. This was an appeal by the Local Authority against the refusal of its application for a secure accommodation order.

Background

B came to the attention of the local authority in 2018 when she made allegations of abuse against a 52 year old man. There followed a number of serious incidents where B made allegations of abuse against others, attacked family members and self harmed. In January 2019 B was accommodated in a residential home under Section 20 of the Children Act. Further acts of aggression followed when she absconded from home on a number of occasions. On at least one occasion, B was found in the company of an adult male. The local authority started care proceedings and were granted an interim care order. B’s behaviour escalated such that she began to abscond from the residential home on several occasions, assaulted staff members, fought with other residents and attempted to harm herself. Her behaviour further escalated and she was involved in a series of incidents where she placed herself at risk of serious harm. By this point, the Local Authority was seeking an approved secure unit, however failed to find such a place and found respite care for her at ‘N House’ which was neither registered with Ofsted nor approved by the Secretary of State for use as secure accommodation. The Local Authority obtained authorisation under the inherent jurisdiction to keep B at N House and to deprive her of her liberty in order to meet her needs while she was placed there. Some of the measures used to keep B secure included being prevented from leaving the premises unless accompanied by support staff with a high level of supervision, of at least 2:1; her access to other young people was restricted until such time her coping mechanisms had improved, all doors and windows were to be kept locked and that she was to be under constant 2:1 supervision.

The Local Authority subsequently found an approved secure unit several 100 miles away from her home and duly applied for an Order under Section 25 of the Children Act. The judge at first instance refused to make an order holding that the criteria was not satisfied and in addition, that it would be disproportionate to make the order. Permission to appeal  the refusal  was eventually considered by Peter Jackson LJ who also invited the Association of Lawyers for Children to intervene by filing written submissions.  

Judgment

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal setting aside the decision to refuse the application under Section 25.

Importance

It is worth reminding ourselves of the criteria in Section 25.

Section 25 of the Children Act 1989 provides:

a child who is being looked after by a Local Authority may not be placed, and if placed, may not be kept, in accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty (“secure accommodation”) unless it appears that

  1. i) He has a history of absconding and is likely to abscond from any other description of accommodation; and

ii) If he is likely to abscond he is likely to suffer significant harm; or

  1. If he is kept in any other description of accommodation he is likely to injury himself or other persons”.

Lord Justice Baker gave the main judgment in this case and determined that there were 4 questions that needed answering:

  1. What is the meaning of “secure accommodation” in s.25?
  2. What are the relevant criteria for making a secure accommodation order under s.25?
  3. What part does the evaluation of welfare play in the court’s decision?
  4. When considering an application for an order under s.25, is the Court obliged, under Articles 5 and 8 of the ECHR, to carry out an evaluation of proportionality?

Lord Justice Baker answered the four questions as follows:

  1. With regard to the meaning of “secure accommodation”, Lord Justice Baker confirmed that secure accommodation is accommodation designed for or having as its primary purpose, the restriction of liberty. However, premises, which are not designed as secure accommodation, may become secure accommodation because of the use to which they are put to in the particular circumstances of the individual case. In this case, the Local Authority argued that the regime at N House as described in evidence clearly amounted to accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting B’s liberty under s.25 and the Court of Appeal accepted that argument. Whilst B had been admitted to N House as a respite placement, the Local Authority had decided that she should remain there for the time being and that given she was the only resident of the property that her liberty would be restricted.  Although N House was not designed as secure accommodation, it had become secure accommodation for B within the meaning of s.25 because of the use to which it had been put in her case.
  2. S.25(3) provides that “it shall be the duty of the court hearing an application under this section to determine whether any relevant criteria for keeping a child in secure accommodation are satisfied” Baker LJ determined that the “relevant criteria” included:
  3. Whether the child is being “looked after” by a local authority
  4. Whether the accommodation proposedby the Local Authority is “secure accommodation”  
  5. Whether if the Local Authority is proposing to place the child in a secure children’s home, the accommodation has been approved by the Secretary of State for that use, and
  6. Whether, if the child is aged under 13, the placement of that specific child has been approved by the Secretary of State.
  7. Baker LJ determined that the child’s welfare is not the Court’s paramount consideration but is plainly an important element in the courts analysis and therefore one of the relevant criteria to be considered.
  8. Baker LJ concluded that proportionality is one of the “relevant criteria” which s.23(3) obliges the court to consider when hearing an application for a secure accommodation under the section.

In future cases there is now a test set out by Lord Justice Baker at paragraph 98 of the Judgment:

  1. Is the child being “looked after” by a local authority, or, alternatively, does he or she fall within one of the other categories specified in regulation 7?
  2. Is the accommodation where the Local Authority proposes to place the child “secure accommodation”, ie: is it designed for or does it have as its primary purpose the restriction of liberty?
  3. Is the Court satisfied (a) that (i) the child has a history of absconding and is likely to abscond from any other description of accommodation, and (ii) If he/she absconds, he/she is likely to suffer significant harm or (b) that if kept in any other description of accommodation, he/she is likely to injure himself or other persons?
  4. If the Local Authority is proposing to place the child in a secure children’s home in England, has the accommodation been approved by the Secretary of State for use as secure accommodation?  If the Local Authority is proposing to place the child in a children’s home in Scotland, is the accommodation provided by a service which has been approved by the Scottish Ministers? In the rare circumstances of the child being aged under 13, Regulation 4 of the 1991 Regulations require that the placement must also be approved by the Secretary of State.
  5. Does the proposed Order safeguard and promote the child’s welfare?
  6. Is the Order proportionate, ie: do the benefits of the proposed placement outweigh the infringement of rights?

This really is a must read case for anyone involved in a case with an application for a secure accommodation order given the clear test now to be applied in those cases.

The Judgment can be found here: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2019/2025.html

Our experienced and specialist team will be happy to help if you have a query about secure accommodation orders, or the involvement of children’s services with your family

Alpa Ghelani

TV EDWARDS SOLICITORS LLP

Accommodation Pending Review

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What happens when a homeless applicant is refused accommodation when the local authority are reviewing a decision made on their homelessness application?

When a local authority makes a negative decision on an applicant’s homelessness application, the applicant usually has the right to request a review of that decision. However, the local authority has discretion to decide whether to accommodate the applicant pending the outcome of the review. The local authority should take into consideration the merits of the review, whether any new information has come to light and the personal circumstances of the applicant when deciding on whether to accommodate the applicant pending the review.

This issue was considered in the case of R. (on the application of Laryea) -v- London Borough of Ealing  [2019] 8 WLUK 164

We acted for the Applicant in this matter who suffers from epilepsy and PTSD. He was found to be in priority need but then later found intentionally homeless. He was placed in temporary accommodation and the local authority decided that they would end the relief duty to him.

The relief duty is a duty for local authorities to take reasonable steps to help the applicant secure suitable accommodation with a reasonable prospect that it will be available for their occupation for at least 6 months. The duty applies when the local authority is satisfied that the applicant is both homeless and eligible for assistance. The reasonable steps to be taken should be in accordance with the applicant’s personalised housing plan.

We assisted the Applicant to request a review of this decision and also for accommodation pending review. The local authority refused on the basis that the Applicant had not taken reasonable steps as agreed in his personalised housing plan.

An application for permission to judicial review the local authority for failing to accommodate the Applicant was issued in the High Court. The application included an application for interim relief – accommodation pending the outcome of the court application.

Three challenges were brought; 1) that the merits of the review itself had not been considered, 2) that the personal circumstances of the Applicant had not been considered and 3) that the local authority had irrationally concluded that the Applicant was not ‘vulnerable’ even when they had already found him to be in priority need for this reason.

The High Court granted interim relief on the basis that the local authority had failed to consider the personal circumstances of the Applicant and the consequences to him of a decision not to accommodate him. It was noted that the Applicant had not taken full advantage of the opportunities offered to him in his Personalised Housing Plan but that had to be considered against his medical background, which includes physical and mental disabilities.

This is a complex area of law so if you, or someone you know, are facing a negative decision from the local authority, then you should seek specialist advice as soon as possible.

TV Edwards has a team of solicitors with expertise in housing cases. If you are seeking legal advice relating to housing issues, then please contact us on 0203 440 8000 or by email to a_housingreferrals@tvedwards.com to see if we can assist.

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Supreme Court decides how and when local authorities can accommodate children without a court order

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The Supreme Court recently gave a judgement in the case of Williams v London Borough of Hackney (2018) UKSC 137 (https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2017-0037-judgment.pdf) which has provided clarification on the scope of local authority powers and duties, under section 20 of the Children Act 1989, to provide accommodation for a child. Maud Davis of TV Edwards acted for one of the interveners, the Association of Lawyers for Children.

Background

The appellants, a mother and father of eight children, brought the case against Hackney after their children were placed in local authority care in July 2007, following the children’s initial removal from the family home by the police (exercising their powers under section 46 of the Children Act 1989). Both parents had been arrested and interviewed by the police, and released on police bail the next day.

Under those bail conditions, the parents were not to have any unsupervised contact with the children. They subsequently signed a safeguarding agreement with Hackney, agreeing that the children should remain in foster care ‘for the present time’. The Court of Appeal, having looked at contemporaneous records, as well as hearing from Mr and Mrs Williams and the social workers involved at the time, said that ‘It was possible that it was not explained that Mr and Mrs Williams could withdraw their consent at any time.’  The Court of Appeal also noted that Mr and Mrs Williams ‘were vulnerable people without advice facing two officials vested with the powers of the state to take their children away, possibly indefinitely’.

The parents then instructed solicitors. Mr Williams’ solicitors wrote to the local authority, confirming his wish to work with them, but also giving formal notice of his intention to withdraw consent to the accommodation of his children under section 20. Mr Williams was prepared to agree to the children remaining in foster care for up to another ten days, to allow for a planned return home; or, failing that, the local authority were asked to provide a timeline.

The children were not returned for a further two months, after the police bail conditions were varied.

The High Court held that the parents had not given their informed consent, and there had been no lawful basis for the accommodation of the children after they were initially removed under police protection. Their claim for damages under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), article 8 (right to respect for privacy and family life) was successful,  and they were awarded damages of £10,000 each.

The Court of Appeal allowed Hackney’s appeal and noted that section 20 refers to the word ‘objects’, but the word ‘consent’ is not mentioned. The court noted that the continued existence of the police bail condition meant that Mr and Mrs Williams were ‘prevented … for whatever reason’ from providing suitable accommodation and care for their children (see section 20(1)). As they were not ‘able’ to provide accommodation for their children, their statutory right to object to the children’s continuing accommodation was not triggered (s 20(7)). Put simply, section 20 does not require parents to consent to their child being accommodated, and the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court’s decision.  

Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and held that, as the appellants did not object or unequivocally request the immediate return of their children, there had been a lawful basis for the children’s continued accommodation under section 20. The only substantive judgement was given by Lady Hale.

Importance

With regard to section 20, there are nine key points:

  1. The starting point is parental responsibility, and a person with parental responsibility may delegate the exercise of his or her parental responsibility. A local authority cannot interfere with a person’s exercise of their parental responsibility, against their will, unless they have first obtained a court order – only the police can do that under section 46 of the Children 1989 Act.
  2. It may be confusing to talk of parental “consent” to removal (or accommodation). Rather this is a form of delegation of the exercise of parental responsibility, for the time being, to the local authority. The delegation must be real and voluntary, or the local authority would have no lawful basis for taking the child away. The impression should not be given that the parent has no choice in the matter. It is best the parent is fully informed of her rights under section 20, but a delegation can be “real and voluntary” without being fully “informed”.
  3. Removing a child from the care of a parent is very different from acting when a parent is not looking after the child. In such a case, section 20 gives the local authority the power, and the duty, to accommodate the child, and the parent’s active consent or delegation of parental responsibility is not needed. The same applies if there is no-one with parental responsibility, or the child is abandoned or lost. Nevertheless, it is good practice for the local authority to give parents clear information about what has happened, and the parents’ rights, and the local authority’s responsibilities (including, if appropriate, the local authority’s power – and duty – to bring proceedings if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the child is at risk of significant harm if they do not).
  4. Parents may ask the local authority to accommodate a child, as a child in need, and the local authority may have a duty to do so if the circumstances fall within section 20(1). If they fall within section 20(4), there is power to do so. Again, this is a delegation of the exercise of parental responsibility for the time being. Section 20 does not expressly require “informed” consent, but it is good practice to give parents clear information about their rights and the local authority’s responsibilities.
  5. Section 20 (7) restricts the local authority’s powers and duties. The local authority cannot accommodate a child if a parent with parental responsibility is willing and able either to accommodate the child herself or to arrange for someone else to do so, and that parent objects to the local authority providing accommodation. If the local authority believes the parent is unable to care for the child, or the accommodation is unsuitable, then it would have to issue care proceedings.
  6. A parent with parental responsibility may remove the child from the accommodation at any time. There is no need to give notice, written or otherwise. However, anyone has the right to take necessary steps to protect a person, including a child, from being physically harmed by another. So, if a parent drunkenly demanded the child’s return home, the carer could (under section 3(5) of the Children Act 1989) do what is reasonable in all the circumstances to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare. Beyond that, the local authority would have to rely on police protection or apply for an emergency protection order (if there is reasonable cause to believe that the child will otherwise suffer significant harm). Otherwise, a parent whose clear request for the immediate (or timed) return of an accommodated child is refused can enforce her rights, by removing the child.
  7. If there is a child arrangements order (live with) under section 8 of the Children Act 1989, or some other order that a child lives with a particular person (e.g. under the inherent jurisdiction, or a special guardianship order), then that parent cannot object or remove the child from s20 accommodation if the person with whom the child is to live agrees to the child being accommodated. That is because such orders restrict the parent’s exercise of parental responsibility.
  8. Section 20 makes special provision for children over 16, and once an accommodated child reaches 16, a parent has no right to object or to remove the child if she is willing to be accommodated by the local authority.
  9. There is no limit on the duration of section 20 accommodation. However, local authorities have duties towards accommodated children, such as a duty to safeguard and promote their welfare, in consultation with both the children and their parents. The Care Planning, Placement and Case Review (England) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/959, apply, requiring the local authority to assess a child’s “needs for services to achieve or maintain a reasonable standard of health or development” and prepare a care plan for her, to be agreed with the parents if practicable (regulation 4(1), (4)). The care plan has to record arrangements made to meet the child’s needs and the long term plan for her upbringing (“the plan for permanence”) (regulation 5(a) and (b)).

So, section 20 does not give local authorities compulsory powers over parents or their children and must not be used as such. If a parent does enter into an agreement regarding their child’s accommodation, they are delegating the exercise of parental responsibility for that time only.  The delegation must be ‘real’ and ‘voluntary’ (although delegation may be real and voluntary even if the parents are not fully informed).

The best way to ensure there is real and voluntary delegation of parental responsibility is for local authorities and parents to enter into a safeguarding agreement. Although a safeguarding agreement is a matter of good practice only, it is important that it does not give the impression that the parents have no right to object or to remove their children. 

Although there is no statutory time limit on the length of time a child may be accommodated under section 20, accommodating children for long periods, without initiating care proceedings could breach the law. Depending on the circumstances, it could be seen as unreasonable in terms of judicial review, or a breach of the child’s or parents’ rights under article 8 of the ECHR.

When section 20 accommodation works well, it promotes children’s safety and well being, with the chance for parents and social workers to work together in children’s best interests. If it works badly, there is a risk of drift and uncertainty for children, misunderstanding, and the breakdown of parents’ relationships with social workers. This judgment, providing lawyers and social workers with clarity in this crucial aspect of local authority powers and duties, is therefore very welcome.

By Maud Davis and Ralph Marnham

TV EDWARDS SOLICITORS LLP

Deprivation of Liberty & the Court of Protection – upcoming changes

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What happens when an adult cannot make decisions about their own welfare and they are subject to restrictions where they live?

Some adults are unable to make decisions for themselves at the time when they need to be made – they “lack mental capacity”. This could be for a variety of reasons such as mental health problems, learning difficulties, brain injuries, or diseases like Alzheimer’s. An adult who lacks capacity (known as “P” in the law) may be subject to restrictions in the place they live, be it a care home, a hospital, a supported living placement, or their own home.

There is often a good reason for these restrictions, which are normally in place to keep P safe from harm. However, the courts have said that any restrictions that amount to a deprivation of P’s basic human right to liberty need to be scrutinised carefully and properly authorised in order to ensure that P’s rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 are protected.

The courts have decided that there is likely to be a deprivation of liberty where P is not free to leave the accommodation and is subject to close supervision and control. The courts have also said that the need for scrutiny and authorisation applies even if the restrictions are likely to benefit P or even if P appears to be happy with the arrangements.

Currently there are two main systems for scrutinising and authorising the deprivation of liberty of an adult who lacks capacity, depending on what sort of setting they are living in.

If P is residing in a care home or hospital, then their deprivation of liberty is authorised under the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (“DoLS”) system. Under this system, P’s local authority should scrutinise the arrangements in place at the care home or hospital and then decide whether or not to grant an authorisation and whether or not to attach any conditions to the authorisation.

If P is residing in any other setting, such as in supported accommodation, and there is some involvement from a local authority or NHS body in their living and care arrangements, then their deprivation of liberty is meant to be authorised by the Court of Protection. The Court of Protection is a specialist court dealing with cases that concern adults who do or may lack the mental capacity to make important decisions. In straightforward cases there is a “streamlined” procedure for obtaining authorisation from the Court of Protection for a person’s deprivation of liberty, where P is not in a care home or hospital but in some other setting.

From 1 October 2020 a new unified system is going to be in place. A new law called the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 has recently been passed and this is going to significantly change the system for authorising deprivations of liberty. This new system will be known as Liberty Protection Safeguards (“LPS”). The new system will apply to those aged 16 and over.

Under the new LPS system a local authority or NHS body will be able to authorise arrangements giving rise to a deprivation of P’s liberty in any setting, not just in care homes and hospitals.

Before a responsible body can authorise P’s arrangements, it will need to be satisfied that three key conditions are met – these are:

  • the person who is the subject of the arrangements lacks the capacity to consent to the arrangements;
  • the person has a mental disorder (meaning a disorder or disability of the mind, not just mental health problems); and
  • the arrangements are necessary and proportionate to prevent harm to the person and proportionate in relation to the likelihood and seriousness of harm to the person.

Before an authorisation can be made there will need to be consultation with P and any family members. P may be represented and supported either by an appropriate person or an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate (IMCA) when an authorisation is being proposed and while an authorisation is in place.

In all cases, someone who is not involved in the day-to-day care of P will need to do a pre-authorisation review to check whether conditions 1, 2 and 3 are met or whether it is reasonable to conclude that they are met. In some cases, including where P objects to the proposed arrangements, an Approved Mental Capacity Professional will need to carry out the pre-authorisation review.

Once an authorisation is in place there will need to be regular reviews of the authorisation by the local authority or NHS body or in some circumstances the manager of the care home in which P lives. There will also be a right to go to the Court of Protection to challenge the authorisation if P or those concerned about P wish to do so.

For now the current system of DoLS authorisations and Court of Protection authorisations remains in place, but the new LPS system will soon be upon us. Anyone interested in these issues will need to keep a careful eye on the details that emerge over the coming months. There is still a lot of detail to be fleshed out in further regulations and a LPS Code of Practice. Importantly there is currently no definition in the new law of what exactly a deprivation of liberty is. We will continue to rely on what the courts have said about what makes a situation a deprivation of liberty, but there will also be guidance given in the new Code of Practice.

This is a complex area of law and so if you are subject to a deprivation of liberty, or you know someone who is, and have concerns about the situation, then you should seek specialist advice as soon as possible.

TV Edwards has a team of solicitors with expertise in mental capacity, deprivation of liberty and Court of Protection cases. If you are seeking legal advice relating to mental capacity, deprivation of liberty or Court of Protection issues,  then please contact us on 0203 440 8000 or by email to a_courtofprotectionreferrals@tvedwards.com to see if we can assist.

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